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Language and communication
It is obvious that literal de-coding of linguistic utterances cannot be 
an adequate and complete explanation for communicative behavior 
(it is “commonsensical” in Sperber and Wilson’s words; Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995, p. 23), and is clearly illustrated by two examples:
1) “Do you know what time it is?”
2) “Oh man, a beer would do me good after all this hard work”
The expected answer to (1) is not just the affirmative “yes” (except 
in slapstick movies) and (2) may be more adequately interpreted 
as a request for a drink than as a factual statement about the belief 
of the speaker with regard to the relationship between beer and 
emotional wellbeing. In natural communication it is the capacity 
to infer someone’s intention from an utterance which seems more 
fundamental than the linguistic de-coding of the message. This 
common-sense statement has been discussed and refined at length 
in the study of pragmatics (“the study of language usage,” Levinson, 
1983; see e.g., Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Tirassa, 1999; Levinson, 
2006; Tomasello, 2008; Airenti, 2010; Bara, 2010). For the present 
purpose it is important to highlight the argument that to be able to 
adequately understand or generate a communicative act, one needs 
to be able to infer another person’s intentions or beliefs.
Although it may seem trivial to claim that language and com-
munication are not the same cognitive construct, there is a potent 
literature arguing that the cognitive system for language crucially 
underlies our ability to infer others’ intentions. Some argue that 
the structure of human language is crucial for representing higher-
order beliefs, as required for mentalizing (Carruthers, 2002; Pyers, 
2006; Newton and de Villiers, 2007). For instance, it is proposed that 
the human mind can only construct representations in which one 
proposition is embedded inside of another (e.g., Mary thinks [that 
the money is in the safe]) through the mediation of language and, 
introduction
Communication can be viewed as a matter of coding and de-coding 
linguistic information. The speaker codes information and puts his 
thoughts into words, while the listener de-codes the linguistic infor-
mation, taking the input from the speaker and translating it back 
into a thought. In this scenario, it is the code (in this case language) 
that matters for communication. Individuals with a common code 
can communicate because they share that code. This is an intuitively 
appealing view given that communication in our everyday lives so 
often relies on language, be it in face-to-face conversation, talking 
on the phone, writing an e-mail, or other forms of exchange. The 
position that it is the code that matters for communication is nicely 
phrased by the philosopher John Searle:
“One can in certain special circumstances ‘request’ someone 
to leave the room without employing any conventions, but unless 
someone has a language one cannot request of someone that he 
e.g., undertake a research project on the problem of diagnosing and 
treating mononucleosis in undergraduates in American universi-
ties.” (Searle, 1969, p. 38)
By this view, we are capable of communicating to some degree 
without language, but real communication requires language and 
all essential communication is linguistic. In terms of cognitive archi-
tecture, this has led to the proposal that understanding others and 
communicating with others by necessity involves the language sys-
tem (e.g., Carruthers, 2002). By contrast, numerous scholars have 
argued for at least an additional inferential ability which crucially 
underlies our communicative skills, as we will describe below.
In the context of this special issue (Understanding human inten-
tional communication), we consider how evidence from human 
neuroscience provides insight into the question of whether the 
capacity for language and the capacity to communicate are cogni-
tively (and neurally) distinct, or whether they are best understood 
as a single cognitive capacity.
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in particular, the recursive capacity of the grammar. Evidence for 
this position comes from the finding that language development and 
performance on false belief tasks, requiring such higher order struc-
tures, are strongly correlated (see Milligan et al., 2007 for review). In 
a false belief task a participant is confronted with a scenario in which 
one of the characters has an incorrect belief about the state of the 
world. The dependent variable is whether the participant (often a 
child) will evaluate the character’s behavior based upon the present 
(“actual”) state of the world, or based upon the false belief that the 
character has. If the participant takes the belief of the character into 
account, she is said to possess a “theory of mind” about others, or to 
“mentalize” about others’ beliefs, desires, and intentions (Wimmer 
and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
A second proposal is that verbs describing speech or cognitive-
mentalizing states such as thinking and remembering are necessary 
for representing the intentions of others. An intriguing demonstra-
tion supporting such a link is the finding that deaf adults learning 
a sign language only start to perform well on false belief tasks after 
they master typical “mentalizing” verbs such as “believe” or “think” 
(Pyers and Senghas, 2009).
In this paper we explore the question of the relationship between 
language and communication/intention understanding from the 
perspective of human neuroscience. In particular, we address the 
question whether there is evidence from neuroimaging and neu-
ropsychological studies to suggest that language and communica-
tion are supported by overlapping or distinct parts of the brain.
a neuraL perspective
evidence from patient popuLations
If inferences regarding someone’s beliefs and intentions necessarily 
require the resources of the language faculty, either from the lexicon 
(e.g., mentalizing verbs) or the recursive capacity of the grammar 
in embedding one proposition within another, then individuals 
with severe language impairment would fail on theory of mind 
(ToM) tasks. Patients with severe agrammatic aphasia usually dis-
play deficits in the comprehension and production of verbs, and 
these impairments are particularly evident on low imageability, 
abstract verbs such as those that describe mental states (McCarthy 
and Warrington, 1985). Severe agrammatism is also characterized 
by difficulties in de-coding the structure of sentences, with impair-
ment in assigning correct agent-patient roles in reversible sentences 
such as “the diver splashed the dolphin”/“the dolphin splashed the 
diver.” More complex structures containing subordinate clauses 
provoke even greater difficulties in comprehension. There are par-
allel difficulties in creating structured sentences, with output at 
best consisting of strings of words (usually nouns), and at worst, 
restricted to social forms such as “hi,” “yes,” or “bye.”
Despite the presence of such profound language impairments, 
patients with severe aphasia are able to succeed on tests of false 
belief understanding (Varley and Siegal, 2000; Varley et al., 2001; 
Apperly et al., 2006). These patients all had extensive damage to 
left hemisphere perisylvian cortex including the traditional fron-
to-temporal language network (see Figure 1). That these patients 
could perform false belief tasks despite their severe damage to the 
language network and concomitant linguistic difficulties, is a first 
indication that mentalizing tasks do not necessarily rely upon the 
language system.
With regard to the inter-relationship between language and com-
munication, patients with severe aphasia have often been observed 
to communicate better than they talk. Through the use of alterna-
tive communicative resources such as drawing, facial expression, 
and gesture some severely aphasic individuals are able to convey 
quite sophisticated messages (see Siegal and Varley, 2002 for an 
example). Goodwin (2006) provides an in-depth analysis of the 
communicative abilities of a severely aphasic man, with a special 
focus on conversational aspects. For instance, by using expressive 
prosodic cues (e.g., emphasis and pitch), the aphasic person was 
able to communicate messages while only using non-sense syllables 
(Goodwin, 1995, 2006).
In a recent study, we investigated the capacities for commu-
nicative intention generation in several aphasic patients in an 
experimentally controlled set-up (Willems et al., submitted). Three 
profoundly aphasic patients engaged in a communicative para-
digm called tacit communication game (TCG), which involves two 
players with different communicative roles. The paradigm consists 
of a 3 × 3 grid on which each player can move around his/her 
visual token, consisting of a simple shape (Figure 2). The overall 
goal is to move the tokens to a preconfigured end-state. There is 
an imbalance in knowledge between the two players: one player 
knows the desired end-state of a trial, whereas the other does not. 
Hence, one player has to use his own token to convey the desired 
end-position and orientation of the other player’s token. Since 
the means of communication in this paradigm is novel (moving 
Figure 1 | An axial slice of an anatomical scan of one of the patients 
tested on a false belief task in Varley and Siegal (2000). Note the extensive 
damage in the left hemisphere, encompassing the whole cortical language 
network. The images are displayed following radiological convention which 
means that the left hemisphere is on the right side of the image.
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these may impact on performance on arguably high-order types of 
language tasks such as understanding deceit or irony. Consequently, 
it remains unclear as to whether an impairment observed in men-
talizing represents a primary deficit, or whether it is secondary to 
disruption of another cognitive process that is necessarily engaged 
in high-order cognitive processing.
In addition to illuminating the role of language in theory of 
mind reasoning, these studies indicate the continuing importance 
of patient-lesion studies in cognitive neuroscience. While functional 
imaging studies reveal the activations associated with a particular 
behavioral-cognitive performance, the lesion method represents 
a means of determining whether the activations reflect a neces-
sary neurocognitive component of the processing network (Bird 
et al., 2004). If performance is maintained despite “knockout” of a 
substrate, the findings point either to a non-mandatory processing 
component or more generally, to plastic, adaptive neural networks 
underpinning some forms of cognition.
evidence from human neuroimaging
Very few neuroimaging studies have looked directly at the relation-
ship between communicative and linguistic abilities. There is a 
relatively large literature investigating the neural basis of “mental-
izing” or ToM (see Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006 for 
reviews), as well as a sizeable number of studies investigating psy-
cholinguistic factors in language production/comprehension such 
as semantic, syntactic, and phonological factors (see Bookheimer, 
2002; Indefrey and Levelt, 2004; Hagoort, 2005; Vigneau et al., 2006 
for review), but only a few studies have looked at communicative 
and linguistic capacities within the same experiment.
tokens on a playing board), participants have to generate a new 
communicative strategy in order to convey the relevant informa-
tion to the other player. Examples of such strategies are to pause 
longer on the desired end-location of the other player, or to move 
back and forth between the desired end-location and a neighbor-
ing location to indicate the desired orientation (de Ruiter et al., 
2007, 2010; Newman-Norlund et al., 2009). The rationale of our 
patient study was that if language is crucially involved in com-
municative intention generation, the aphasic patients should not 
fare well on this task. However, the patients exhibited strategies for 
communication that were entirely comparable to those observed 
in the neurologically healthy population. These findings indicate 
considerable autonomy between language and intentional com-
municative capacity.
Adopting a different experimental strategy, Bara et al. (2001) 
showed that patients with non-focal closed head injuries can be 
unimpaired on standard linguistic test batteries, but exhibit dif-
ficulties with pragmatic aspects of language understanding such 
as understanding deceit. Similarly, Happé et al. (1999) revealed 
that patients with right hemisphere lesions who were not aphasic, 
displayed impairment on tasks requiring attribution of mental 
states to others. Taken together, the capacity to form pragmatic 
inferences requiring some degree of mentalizing can be preserved 
in aphasia, but non-aphasic brain-injured patients may display the 
reverse dissociation, with retention of core linguistic systems of 
syntax and lexis, but disruption of pragmatic-mentalizing capacity. 
However, interpretation of data from patients such as those with 
closed head injury is complex. These individuals may have deficits 
in cognitive capacities such as inhibiting a potent response and 
Figure 2 | The TCg playing board and tokens and sequence of events 
in a trial, viewed from the Sender’s perspective. The Sender’s token is 
in red, the Receiver’s token is in blue. (A) The Sender sees the goal 
configuration. The Receiver does not see the goal configuration. (B) The 
Sender sees the start configuration. (C) The Sender moves his token around 
and gives the turn to the Receiver. (D) The Receiver moves her token into the 
position and rotation indicated by the Sender. (e) Both players get feedback 
(green square).
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Both these studies suggest that producing a communicative act 
for another person relies on different brain areas than those involved 
in language. Furthermore, the areas that are activated during com-
municative message generation are those that have previously been 
observed to be activated in response to mentalizing tasks.
Besides these direct comparisons of language and communica-
tive processes, there have a been a number of studies investigating 
intention understanding during communication as such, without 
necessarily focusing on the relationship with language. As we noted 
above, the neuroimaging literature on mentalizing is extensive (see 
Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006 for reviews) and we 
will focus here only on studies that involve materials specifically 
tailored to investigating communicative intentions.
Walter et al. (2004) investigated the neural distinction between 
understanding of private intentions/beliefs and understanding of 
communicative intentions. In their fMRI study, participants viewed 
short cartoon stories involving people performing actions driven 
by private, non-communicative intentions (e.g., changing a broken 
light bulb because you want to read) as well as stories in which 
characters act with a clear communicative intent (e.g., pointing to a 
bottle to request it). Their main finding was increased activation in 
MPFC for the communicative stories as compared to the individual 
intentional action stories. Moreover, the latter condition did not 
activate MPFC more strongly than a control condition of non-
intentional, physical interactions (e.g., a leaf being blown away by 
the wind). This study highlights the importance of a communicative 
component in driving MPFC activation as opposed to intention 
recognition per se (see also Ciaramidaro et al., 2007).
Kampe et al. (2003) investigated which areas become more acti-
vated when someone is called by his own name (“Hey John!”) versus 
by another person’s name. The rationale is that calling someone by 
his name is a potent indicator of the intention to communicate with 
this person, whereas shouting another person’s name is not. The 
main result was activation in parts of the mentalizing system (MPFC 
and temporal poles) when participants heard and saw someone call-
ing their name as opposed to another’s name. Adopting a different 
approach, Tylen et al. (2009) used photographs of objects or signs 
that had either a communicative intention or no communicative 
intention. For instance, they compared photographs of an arrow 
on the ground (communicating direction) or chairs blocking a 
parking space (signaling “do not park here”) versus objects lying on 
the floor and chairs around a table, not signaling a communicative 
intent. The results showed increased activation to communica-
tive versus non-communicative objects in a set of language related 
areas including the inferior frontal gyri, but not in the traditional 
mentalizing network. These results are not easy to interpret in the 
context of this review since it is conceivable that looking at the 
intentional photos leads to greater or more elaborate vocalizing/
language processing than looking at the non-intentional pictures. 
Another contrasting finding comes from Schippers et al. (2009) 
who did not observe sensitivity of the MPFC (or other mentalizing 
network areas) to the intentional observation of communicative 
gestures as compared to observation of the same gestures with the 
explicit instruction not to interpret their meaning.
Finally, Noordzij et al. (2009) found right posterior tempo-
ral cortex to be specifically involved in the generation as well as 
understanding of an intentional communicative act. They required 
Sassa et al. (2007) presented healthy young participants with 
short movie clips of a person handling a familiar object (e.g., some-
one playing guitar). Participants responded to these movie clips in 
two different task settings. In one task they talked to the person on 
the screen in a “casual,” communicative manner (Communicative 
trials), whereas in the other task they were required to describe 
the scene presented in the movie and not to direct their speech 
to the person in the movie clips (Descriptive trials). Both condi-
tions involved speech production, but only in the Communicative 
trials was there an intentionally communicative component to 
the speech. Comparison of Communicative to Descriptive trials 
showed increased activation in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), 
left temporo-parietal junction and the temporal poles bilater-
ally. This set of regions is part of what has been described as the 
mentalizing network (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 
2006). Both Descriptive and Communicative trials compared to 
baseline led to activation in parts of the traditional language pro-
duction network, such as left inferior frontal gyrus (“Broca’s area”; 
Indefrey and Levelt, 2004), but these regions were not sensitive to 
the Communicative/Descriptive manipulation.
Willems et al. (2010a) directly tested sensitivity of cortical 
areas to an increase in communicative intent on the one hand and 
general linguistic processes on the other hand. Participants were 
engaged in a communicative paradigm called the “Taboo game.” 
In this set-up the participant’s task is to describe a “target word” 
(e.g., “beard”) to another individual without using certain pre-
determined “Taboo words.” That is, there was one person inside an 
MR scanner generating verbal descriptions of various words, while 
the other player listened to these descriptions outside of the MR 
scanner and guessed the target word. There were two experimental 
manipulations: First, communicative intent was manipulated by 
changing whether the listener already knew the target word or not. 
Importantly, the participant was aware of whether the other player 
knew the target word or not. If the listener already knows the target 
word, the utterance that the participant is creating is not helpful 
to the listener. We labeled these trials Non-targeted. By contrast, 
in Targeted trials, the utterance provided by the participant was 
generated in order to help the other player guess the target word. 
Second, the linguistic difficulty of a trial was manipulated. If the 
Taboo words are closely related to the Target word (e.g., “mous-
tache,” “chin,” and “man” in the case of the target word “beard”), one 
needs to search a wider semantic space to come up with a helpful 
description, which makes the task more semantically difficult as 
compared to when the Taboo words are more distantly related to 
the target word. These trials were labeled Difficult and Easy.
The distinct manipulation of Communicative intent and 
Linguistic difficulty was neatly reflected in activation patterns 
in different brain regions (Figure 3). A part of MPFC was more 
strongly activated to Targeted as compared to Non-Targeted tri-
als (the Communicative intent manipulation), but did not show 
sensitivity to the linguistic difficulty manipulation (Figure 3A). By 
contrast, left inferior frontal, and left inferior parietal cortex were 
more strongly activated to Difficult as compared to Easy trials, but 
were not influenced by the communicative intent manipulation 
(Figure 3B). In summary, this study provides neural evidence for 
a dissociation between communicative message generation and 
lexico-semantic language processes.
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discussion
The work that we have reviewed here argues for a neural disso-
ciation between communicative and linguistic capabilities. First, 
there is evidence from lesion patients who despite severe damage 
to the language system perform well on mentalizing tasks, as well 
as on tasks involving the generation of a communicative mes-
sage for another person. Second, neuroimaging in the neurologi-
cally healthy population indicates that distinct parts of the brain 
are involved in the generation of a communicative message as 
compared to linguistic processes. Hence, our main conclusion is 
that communicative abilities should be best understood as neu-
rally – and cognitively – distinct from language and that successful 
communication does not necessitate, nor rely upon a functioning 
language system. We take this as strong evidence for the proposal 
healthy volunteers to engage in the visuo-spatial communication 
paradigm that we described above (TCG). Participants commu-
nicated the position and orientation of a visual token to another 
individual, using only limited visuo-spatial means. It was observed 
that activation in right posterior superior temporal cortex/tempo-
ro-parietal junction was increased when an individual designed a 
communicative act for another person, as well as when that second 
person interpreted the communicative act of the first person. This 
region has been implicated in mentalizing tasks before, and echoes 
the findings of mentalizing deficits in right hemisphere damaged 
patients (Happé et al., 1999 see Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and 
Frith, 2006 for reviews). The overlap is interpreted as evidence for 
similar mechanisms engaged in generation and interpretation of 
communicative intentions.
Figure 3 | A neural dissociation between communicative and linguistic 
abilities. Results from an fMRI study in young healthy participants. 
Participants generated a description of a given concept (“Target word”) while 
they were prohibited to use certain Taboo words. Two factors were 
manipulated: (1) Communicative intent: The participants created the 
description either for another individual (“Targeted trials”) or not for a specific 
other individual (“Non-Targeted trials”) and (2) Linguistic difficulty: Taboo 
words were either semantically closely related to the Target word, making it 
more difficult to come up with a description, or were semantically less closely 
related to the Target word, which makes it more Easy to come up with a 
description. (A) Shows the result of comparing Targeted versus Non-Targeted 
trials, (B) shows results of the Difficult versus Easy comparison. The results 
show that medial prefrontal cortex was sensitive to the Communicative intent 
manipulation (A), but not to the linguistic difficulty manipulated, whereas an 
opposite pattern was observed in left inferior frontal cortex (B). Figure adapted 
from Willems et al. (2010a).
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From this association, it has been taken that the capacity to under-
stand intentions of others (that is, to possess a ToM) is crucially 
dependent upon certain aspects of language being in place. A full 
exposition of this literature is beyond the scope of our paper, but 
it should be noted that this conclusion relies on equating perform-
ance on false belief tasks with intention recognition or mentalizing 
abilities. This relationship has been criticized because false belief 
tasks tax multiple cognitive systems, and plausibly involve other 
factors than “just” mentalizing, such as working memory load (e.g., 
Bloom and German, 2000). Furthermore, false belief tasks may 
only tap into a subset of ToM capabilities and indeed, research 
with preverbal infants seems to suggest that equating false belief 
understanding with mentalizing abilities is not well justified. That 
is, despite the absence of syntactic structures and lexical forms that 
have been claimed to be necessary for the representation of false 
beliefs, there is evidence that preverbal infants show the capac-
ity to understand another person’s intentions (Behne et al., 2005; 
Liszkowski, 2006; Liszkowski et al., 2008; cf. Aureli et al., 2009), 
and to attribute false beliefs to another individual (Onishi and 
Baillargeon, 2005; Baillargeon et al., 2010).
Some have argued that, although the abilities of infants show 
that intention recognition can precede language development, it 
is not until relatively late in preschool years (around 4 years of 
age) that children develop “the real thing” for ToM, namely false 
belief understanding (Pyers, 2006). This argument is reminiscent 
of the quote with which we started our contribution. Searle argued 
that communication without language is perhaps possible, but that 
this is just a marginal phenomenon, as one cannot communicate 
about abstract and difficult concepts such as mononucleosis with-
out language (see Introduction and Searle, 1969). In the case of false 
belief understanding and language development, this argument 
breaks down when we again recognize that false belief tasks include 
components other than intention recognition alone. Moreover, the 
compelling evidence for intention recognition abilities in prever-
bal infants cannot be marginalized by referring to the inability of 
children under 4 years of age to pass a false belief task.
On top of the evidence from pre-verbal infants, we described 
findings from severely aphasic patients who, despite their severe 
limitation in language ability, are able to pass false belief tests. This 
casts further doubt upon the relationship between language and 
mentalizing abilities in the sense that even on standard measures of 
mentalizing, performance can be maintained without a fully func-
tioning language system. It is possible that the role of language in 
mentalizing may be restricted to configuring the capacity for ToM 
in early childhood, and thus if language is impaired in later life as 
in acquired aphasia, mentalizing ability is not lost with the loss 
of language. However, the convergence of evidence from infancy 
and adults with aphasia strengthens the case as to the considerable 
autonomy between these two cognitive capacities.
concLusion
In summary, we reviewed evidence from neuroimaging in healthy 
participants as well as results from neuropsychological populations 
which show that the generation of a communicative message is best 
thought of as a capacity which is distinct from core linguistic proc-
esses. Hence the perspective from neuroscience compellingly argues 
for loosening the presumed causal ties between  communicative 
that communicative and linguistic abilities are cognitively distinct 
(Tomasello et al., 2005; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2008; Airenti, 
2010; Bara, 2010).
separate capacities or extended Language network?
It would be a mistake to interpret our conclusion of separate cogni-
tive capacities for language and communication as meaning that 
language and communication have little to do with each other. On 
the contrary, as we described in the introduction, it is trivially the 
case that language is used mainly and perhaps almost exclusively 
in a communicative manner in everyday life. Indeed, part of the 
success story of the human species is due to its capacity to use 
language as a communicative device.
The fact that our capacity to understand the intentions of others 
is interlinked with normal language use, has led some to propose 
an “extended language network,” encompassing mentalizing related 
areas such as MPFC as well as areas more traditionally implicated 
in language (Ferstl et al., 2008). We are sympathetic to the notion 
that language entails more than the traditional semantic, syntactic 
and phonological processing of spoken and written words. Indeed, 
neuroimaging studies show that “non-linguistic” input such as from 
hand gestures and from visual information activate parts of the 
traditional language network (Willems et al., 2007, 2008, 2009; 
Holle et al., 2008; Straube et al., 2009), and that areas outside of the 
traditional language network can be involved in language under-
standing. An example of the latter is activation of the motor cortex 
when participants read action-related language (e.g., “He kicks the 
ball”; Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 
2006; Willems and Hagoort, 2007; Willems et al., 2010b,c).
However, we feel that incorporating mentalizing abilities into 
an extended language network is not a helpful conceptualization. 
We showed evidence for a separation of mentalizing abilities and 
linguistic abilities in the human brain, such as in the case of patients 
who have lost the capacity for language, but are still able to commu-
nicate. Moreover, lexico-semantic processing can be distinguished 
from communicative message generation in the healthy human 
brain. The separation of linguistic and communicative abilities 
therefore seems a more fruitful characterization rather than call-
ing both “language,” and allows for some forms of communication 
that are not linguistic. Although it is clear that there is not a sin-
gle, monolithic neural network only involved in language (see e.g., 
Willems and Hagoort, 2007), it seems reasonable to use the term 
“language network” for areas involved in the traditional semantic, 
syntactic and phonological processing triangle as a shorthand in 
scientific literature as well as in clinical practice. However, it must 
be realized that other parts of the brain are crucially involved in 
everyday language production and comprehension.
a counter-argument from deveLopment
There is a sizeable literature which argues for the opposite con-
clusion to the one that we have reached, namely that language 
and mentalizing/communicative abilities are causally related and 
that the capacity to mentalize about others’ beliefs, intentions and 
desires crucially depends upon language abilities. An important 
source of evidence for this position is the observation that perform-
ance on false belief tasks correlates with several aspects of language 
development (Milligan et al., 2007; see Pyers, 2006 for discussion). 
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